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Nicola Barker, Not The Marrying Kind: A Feminist 
Critique of Same-Sex Marriage (Basingstoke, UK: 




With all that we have learned, we should be 
helping our heterosexual brothers and sisters 
out of their state-defined prisons, not 
volunteering to join them there. 
Jane Rule2 
 
The word "marriage" has a meaning. If it wasn't 
so important, we wouldn't be here today. 
       Jeffrey (8 the Play)3 
 
Most significantly, in terms of the feminist 
critiques of marriage, it is not possible to 
simultaneously seek recognition through 
marriage and argue that family is not an 
appropriate mechanism through which to 
distribute social resources.  
Nicola Barker4 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1  Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Victoria. Thanks 
to Sharon Cowan for criticism and comments, to the anonymous 
reviewer for the careful read, and to the cast, crew and audience of 
UVic Law’s production of  “8” for inspiration. 
2  Jane Rule, The Heterosexual Cage of Coupledom (2001), online: 
ABC Book World <http://www.abcbookworld.com>. 
3  Dustin Lance Black, “8” at 7.  Copy on file with the author. 
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LIGHTS COME UP ON THE UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT 
OF CALIFORNIA, A LARGE COURTROOM5 
 
In the spring of 2013, as part of their course requirements for 
“Sexual Orientation and the Law,” a group of UVic law 
students staged a reading of Dustin Lance Black’s play “8”.6  
Using the trial transcripts of Perry v Schwarzenegger7 as the 
primary source, the play is a courtroom drama, designed to be 
read aloud and to bring people into the formal equality 
arguments at the heart of these American cases.8 The course 
was designed to engage students on critical questions about the 
relationship between law and sexuality looking both at how 
sexuality and law are constructed in the world around us, and at 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4  Nicola Barker, Not the Marrying Kind: A Feminist Critique of Same-
sex Marriage (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2013) at 197. 
5  Stage direction. Black supra note 3 at 2. 
6  “‘8’ The Play: Presented by University of Victoria Faculty of Law” 
(2013), online: American Foundation for Equal Rights 
<http://www.8theplay.com>. The cast members included 16 students, 
the 11 year-old son of one of the students, three guest professors from 
the law school, and one visiting professor who also worked with the 
students all semester. 
7  Decision of Justice Vaughn Walker, United States District Court for 
the Northern District of California, in Perry v Schwarzenegger, 704 F 
Supp (2d) 921 at 1004 (ND Cal 2010). 
8  See “About 8”, online: American Foundation for Equal Rights 
<http://www.8theplay.com> for details about “8” the Play. See also 
Kevin Jagernauth, “Watch: Reading of Dustin Lance Black’s Prop ‘8’ 
Play Featuring George Clooney, Brad Pitt, John C Reilly, Kevin 
Bacon & More” (5 March 2012), online: Indiewire 
<http://www.indiewire.com>. For press on the UVic reading, see 
Amy Smart, “UVic law school sponsors reading of same-sex 
marriage play” (12 March 2013), online: Times Colonist 
<http://www.timescolonist.com>.  
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how law and its tools shape and place limits on queer 
movements.  Primarily, it was designed for the students to use 
as many differing methodologies as the semester would allow 
in order to explore the relationships between the lived reality of 
law and social movements, broadly cast.  Embodiment was a 
central theme, and ultimately producing and performing the 
play was the primary medium for thinking about queer legal 
theory9 in action. 
 
The students were given primary responsibility for all 
the elements of production, from casting through publicity, to 
facilitating the talkback, as well as bringing to life each of the 
characters in Black’s play.10  As their instructor, I took 
responsibility for ensuring that they had the best chance at 
success, liaising for over a year with the New York producers, 
staging a closed reading of the play with an earlier group of 
students in the spring of 2012, and bringing in a theatre 
professional to help the students with the “acting” component 
of their task.11  I also laid the groundwork for the play-reading 
through my own previous experience and scholarship on the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9  I approach “queer legal theory” not as a standalone theoretical model, 
but one informed by feminist legal theories, one that centres questions 
of the power of heteronormativity, and works both to transgress and 
transform through methodologies that challenge binaries and are 
often performative in nature. 
10  In order to stage “8” permission must be sought from the producers 
through the American Foundation for Equal Rights and Broadway 
Impact.  Once permission is granted, resources are made available to 
the group staging the play including templates for programs and 
posters, a guide for holding a talkback, and video clips for projection, 
amongst other material. See “Stage a Reading”, American 
Foundation for Equal Rights, online: <http://www.8theplay.com>.  
11  Special thanks to Lina de Guevara, founding Artistic Director of 
Victoria’s Puente Theatre for her work with the actors to prepare 
them for a staged reading. 
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theoretical elements of using a play-reading to teach law,12 as 
well as introducing these students to various legal theories tied 
to sexual identity.13  Through the course readings and the 
various exercises we undertook together throughout the 
semester,14 the students built the skills so that by the night of 
the play, they were prepared to bring queer legal theory in 
action to UVic Law. 
 
My role, the night of the play, was to work the lights.  
As Director, it enabled me to keep the play moving while being 
part of the production, as I stood behind the actors on the stage.  
The room in which we performed the play-reading is the 
largest that the law school has15 but it was not designed for 
performance, and as such the transitions between scenes were 
more a basic turning the lights on and off than the original 
script envisions.  What my position enabled me to do, however, 
was to watch the audience as the play was performed from 
behind the actors’ arc of chairs.  Amongst the many surprises 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12  See Gillian Calder, “Guantanamo: Using a Play-Reading to Teach 
Law” (2010) 142 Canadian Theatre Review 44-49. 
13  Some of the authors that the students read this term included: Sharon 
Cowan, Judith Butler, Janet Halley, Elaine Craig, Jack Judith 
Halberstam, Paisley Currah, Francisco Valdes, Andrea Smith, 
Suzanne Lenon, Val Napoleon, and Dean Spade. 
14  Some of the exercises that the students did this term to prepare 
included: mapping; mural making; image theatre; queer dressing; and 
storytelling as well as rehearsing and staging the play. For a student’s 
perspective on this course please see: Jasreet Badyal, “Perry v 
Schwarzenegger: An Opportunity to ‘Do’ Law Differently” (2014) 
Appeal 3-20 
15  Two students had responsibility for finding a venue on campus where 
we could perform the play to a potentially large audience. They 
ultimately chose the largest room at the law school (it can 
accommodate 304 people), but also so that the play could be a 
transformative experience within a building that can be, for many 
students, an oppressive space. 
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of the night, the one that caught me unawares was when, at 
page 26 of a play that I have read many, many times and 
watched performed by students for whom I care deeply, I 
thought to myself, “I don’t really like this play”.  I will return 
to that visceral response in a moment. 
 
The actual evening of our performance was fantastic.  
The students were amazing in their reading, with each actor 
rising to a level of performance that I had not seen in any 
rehearsal.  And the audience responded.  The laughed, they 
grew still, and when the performance was over, they stayed and 
participated in a lively, challenging, and epiphanal talkback.  
The questions allowed the actors to step out of their characters 
and talk about what it had meant to them, as part of learning 
law, to be in this play.  In response the students demonstrated 
how their reading and learning through the semester had 
prepared them to perform a polemical play, geared to persuade 
an audience that same-sex marriage is the culmination of 
equality for gays and lesbians, through a queer theory lens.  
They talked about their discomfort with the play and its 
message.  Even when confronted by a homophobic audience 
member, arguing through the lens of religion for a 
heteronormative rearticulation of the institution of marriage, 
the students responded with honesty, compassion, and startling 
insight.  It was a night in my legal teaching career that will 
always stand out. 
 
And yet, I was left with unease around the play itself.  
Despite my conviction that embodied methodologies bring 
something to the learning of law that is painfully missing from 
most classrooms,16 I was still worried that in some shape or 
form I had made a mistake in asking these students to perform 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16  See for example, Suzanne Bouclin, Gillian Calder & Sharon Cowan, 
“Playing Games with Law” in Zenon Bańkowski, Maksymilian Del 
Mar & Paul Maharg, eds, The Arts and the Legal Academy: Beyond 
Text in Legal Education (Farnham, UK: Ashgate, 2013) 69-85 at 69. 
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this play.  And then I read Nicola Barker’s exceptional text, 
Not the Marrying Kind: A Feminist Critique of Same-Sex 
Marriage17. 
 
This text is essential reading for anyone engaged in 
questioning how law regulates a Western notion of the family.  
In particular, as we watch the inevitable redefinition of 
marriage in many countries throughout the world to be 
inclusive of gays and lesbians, it enables the critical reader to 
stay engaged with the underlying questions of why we continue 
to centre marriage in our understanding of what constitutes a 
legal family.  Dr. Barker’s text is both a compelling and a 
careful telling of the story of marriage in the Western world18, 
and a powerful feminist critique of the march to inclusion.  She 
argues with painstaking thoroughness that the same critical lens 
that second-wave feminists have brought to the institution of 
heterosexual marriage should also be brought to bear on same-
sex marriage, while paying due attention to the voices of queer 
legal theorists who assert the transformative and transgressive 
potential that rethinking the family could entail. 
 
In this review, I will walk through how Barker 
structures her argument, offering my own view that the creative 
lens that she brings to bear on the issue of the legalization of 
same-sex marriage is a necessary point of view for all those 
interested in questions of family and family law. I will then 
offer some critiques of the text and its argument, particularly 
with respect to how, on its central questions, it works to marry 
feminist legal theory and queer theory.  I will then conclude by 
returning to “8”, with some final reflections on the peace that 
Barker’s text brought to me about having asked my students 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17     Supra note 4. 
18  The countries that figure most prominently in her analysis are 
Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and South 
Africa. 
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(and colleagues) to bare their souls on the edifice of marriage 
equality. 
 
WILL SAME-SEX MARRIAGE TRANSFORM 
MARRIAGE? 
 
Structure and Argument 
 
This book is a tour de force.  It is a model for how to structure 
and answer a legal question, and as such should be read not just 
by those interested in questions of feminist and queer legal 
theories, practitioners and students of family law, or members 
of the LGBTTIQ communities, but by all legal scholars 
working to bring a complicated question of law to life.  The 
argument at the heart of this manuscript is very simple. Barker 
asserts that the key question of the same-sex marriage debate is 
not whether same-sex couples should be legally permitted to 
marry; it is instead whether the institution of marriage itself can 
evolve to overcome the problems that have made marriage an 
oppressive site for female-identified persons and a consistent 
target of second-wave feminist critique.19 That is, while most 
of the focus has been on the “same-sex” part of the issue, the 
more complicated and problematic questions arise when we 
look more carefully at the institution of marriage itself.  Not to 
spoil the ending of this fabulous text, but after a painstaking 
laying of the foundation, Barker answers her own question: 
marriage remains a gendered and imbalanced institution, and 
despite egalitarian shifts, the heteronormative marriage model 
looms large. But the joy of the book is that reaching this 
conclusion is far from simple.  While clearly arguing that 
accessing the institution itself should be approached cautiously, 
she leaves us with optimism drawn from queer legal theory, 
both for the transformative and transgressive potential of same-
sex marriage, but also for the ways in which feminist legal 
theory can benefit from queer perspectives. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19  Barker, supra note 4 at 198. 
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The structure of the argument is beautiful. Barker starts 
her analysis by carefully framing the institution at the heart of 
her text: the institution of marriage. In this approach, Barker 
does two unique things. First, she challenges the Hyde v Hyde20 
definition itself, the common law articulation of marriage that 
has been front and centre in many of the legal challenges, 
particularly in Canada.  Drawing primarily on Rebecca Probert, 
she argues that the “idea of marriage as set out in Hyde was 
more important than its accuracy”21.  Marriage is an ideal, not 
an essential, universal, and natural institution.22 This enables 
her, secondly, to set up the clear focus of her critique, which is 
not in fact marriage, but what she terms the “marriage model”.  
Instead of delineating legal marriage from other marriage-like 
relationships, she keeps the aim of her critique and analysis 
firmly planted on state-sanctioned relationships characterized 
by commitment, conjugality, monogamy, and 
interdependence.23  Working with the marriage model, she sets 
the groundwork to demonstrate how much of the analysis to 
date on same-sex marriage has been about access to the 
institution, rather than a careful consideration of what it means 
to be married, legally socially, and ideologically.24  
 
She also tells us up front that she will approach her 
research questions using twin theoretical lenses: second wave 
feminist legal theories and queer legal theories.  Working with 
the question, posed here and by others, of why there are notable 
silences from feminist legal theorists on the questions of same-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20  Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1866) LR 1 P&D 130 
21  Supra note 4 citing Probert at 20. 
22  Ibid at 21. 
23  Ibid at 39, 65. 
24  Ibid at 12. 
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sex marriage25, she weaves a unique template for analysis: how 
to bring together divergent approaches to equality to offer a 
forward-looking and biting critique of an institution that has 
not been a safe haven for female-identified persons.26 Although 
there is more overlap and integration between feminist and 
queer theories than Barker acknowledges, bumping these two 
theoretical traditions against each other offers a lively tension 
for the text, and simultaneously ensures that the question of 
who remains excluded from marriage, even as it expands to 
include same-sex unions, does not go missing from the 
analysis.27  
 
With the normative model of relationship in hand, 
Barker then moves, in Chapter 2, to look at the different 
institutions that have arisen over the last twenty years or so, to 
address questions of relationship recognition primarily for gays 
and lesbians. In each model that she examines – domestic 
partnership, reciprocal beneficiary, civil union, registered 
partnership, civil partnership, civil solidarity pact and de facto 
relationships – she shows two things. First, she demonstrates 
how each of the models adheres to the marriage model, and 
secondly, where the divergences exist between these models in 
structure, legal consequences, and ideology. She argues that 
alternative models of relationship recognition map onto and 
affirm the centrality of the marriage model, ironically reifying 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25  See for example, Rosemary Auchmuty, “Out of the Shadows: 
Feminist Silence and Liberal Law” in Vanessa E Munro & Carl F 
Stychin, eds, Sexuality and the Law: Feminist Engagements 
(Abingdon, UK: Routledge-Cavendish, 2007); and Claire Young & 
Susan Boyd, “Losing the Feminist Voice?  Debates on the Legal 
Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships in Canada” (2006) 14 Fem 
Legal Stud 213. 
26  Barker sets out her theory in the introduction, supra note 4 at 7-12, 
returning to it with more intention in chapters 5 and 6. 
27  Ibid at 12. 
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the marriage model through their existence.  At the same time, 
the gaps and spaces and the way these models offer a different 
performance of relationship, are the building blocks for Barker.  
Her examination of what second-wave feminist theorizing and 
queer legal theory does with these spaces is one of the unique 
contributions of this volume. 
 
Having looked at the normative marriage model, and 
then presented numerous ways in which relationship 
recognition has been sought in differing jurisdictions, Barker 
then turns to same-sex marriage litigation, highlighting the 
legal arguments necessary to secure access to the institution of 
marriage for those excluded on the basis of their gender and the 
degree to which they have been accepted by courts and 
legislatures.  In her third chapter, she moves through the 
evolutions and revolutions28 of the legal challenges brought in 
various jurisdictions throughout Europe, North America, and 
the southern African continent, looking at the broad themes 
that arise, how the arguments in those cases are framed, and 
how the question of procreation as part of marriage emerges.  
Barker demonstrates, notwithstanding different legal cultures 
and constitutional histories, that there are some powerful 
similarities in using courts to achieve this kind of social 
change.  As she moves from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, we see 
sameness and formal equality and the symbolism of marriage 
to excluded communities, all situated in a context in which 
there is a heightened backlash against the expansion of 
marriage. 
 
With this foundation, the second part of the book 
moves into the key arguments for and against same-sex 
marriage.  Chapter 4 is an unsettling chapter that looks, 
optimistically, at the legal quest for marriage equality through a 
feminist lens.  With substantive equality at the heart of her 
analysis, Barker leaves behind the formal equality and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28  Ibid at 67. 
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symbolic recognition arguments that she identified in Chapter 
3, to positively engage with arguments that focus on difference 
rather than sameness.29  Barker is rigorous in this chapter, 
working to engage with the various scholars, theorists, and 
zealots, who come at the question of why same-sex marriage is 
important from so many different angles.  She lays bare the 
argument that to continue a politics of exclusion is to reinforce, 
in the most hateful of ways, that lesbians and gay men are 
outsiders to the very idea of family.30 Even for those of us who 
remain emphatically critical of marriage as an institution, she 
manages to create in us a form of longing – the very feeling I 
got, for example, when I saw the image of Ernie and Bert on 
the front page of the New Yorker magazine watching the US 
Supreme Court on television.31  She concludes her chapter with 
due attention to the arguments for same-sex marriage as a way 
to challenge oppression on the one hand, and as transgressive 
and subversive on the other.  Alongside the kind of hope that 
strategies of resistance can evoke, Barker continues to remind 
the reader, however, that the forms of oppression experienced 
by gay men and lesbians who are excluded from marriage 
remain different from the forms of oppression experienced by 
heterosexual women within it.32 
 
The book then moves to its crux, asking: is there a 
singular feminist perspective on same-sex marriage? And what 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29  Ibid at 113. 
30  Ibid at 115. 
31  Causing a stir in social media, the New Yorker’s June 28, 2013 cover 
was a moving image of Sesame Street puppets and “room-mates” 
embracing while watching the US Supreme Court render their 
decision on the constitutionality of the Defence of Marriage Act and 
California’s Proposition 8.  For example, see Francoise Mouly and 
Mina Kaneko, “Cover Story: Bert and Ernie’s “Moment of Joy”” (28 
June 2013), online: The New Yorker <http://www.newyorker.com>. 
32  Barker, supra note 4 at 126. 
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potential do second-wave theories bring to third-wave families?  
Having taken apart formal equality approaches to marriage, 
Barker now moves to argue why fighting for inclusion is in fact 
a dangerous strategy.  Revisiting primarily second-wave radical 
and social feminist theories of marriage, she argues 
convincingly that those critiques still hold. She asserts that the 
model of marriage in the 21st century is deeply neoliberal, 
begging for deconstruction not inclusion.  Using primarily a 
social reproduction lens, Barker argues that the changes outside 
the home are not matched within it33, with changes that have 
occurred taking place more at the individual than at the 
structural level, leaving the gendered division of labour intact.34  
Drawing on some of the most powerful academic voices in 
family law in Canada, the United States, and the UK, Barker 
concludes that legal recognition of same-sex marriage supports 
the privatization of care with the “form that the family 
takes…less significant to the neoliberal state than the functions 
it performs on behalf of capitalism”.35  Somewhere, Martha 
Fineman is tipping her hat. 
 
Having made the economic argument, Barker moves to 
her penultimate chapter, “Outlaws and In-Laws: The 
‘Ambivalent Gift’ of Legal Legitimation”.36  While this chapter 
stands alone as a queer engagement with the idea of marriage, 
it works as the final substantive chapter in the volume.  Indeed, 
the power of this chapter is that most refuting arguments have 
been addressed in the pages that precede it.  Having addressed 
both the argument that same-sex marriage might bring change 
from within to the institution of marriage, and the dangers of 
capitulation and assimilation, she now turns her energy to the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33  Ibid at 148. 
34  Ibid at 158. 
35  Ibid citing Shelley Gavigan at 162. 
36  Ibid at 164-197. 
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final argument that the inclusion of same-sex folk in marriage 
may lead to a destabilization of the institution’s existing 
parameters.  And, as with each of the previous chapters, Barker 
moves painstakingly through each element of the argument, 
from Carol Smart’s warnings about using law in this way,37 
through a more distinctively queer model of citizenship.38  
Barker ends up showing her true socialist feminist roots, 
however, in confessing her inability to see in the near future at 
least, that any change to the inclusivity of marriage can in turn 
lead to what she claims is the essential element for substantive 
equality, transformative redistribution.39 For now, marriage 
remains a means of distribution of social resources that is both 
partial and fundamentally unjust. 
 
Barker concludes, as she had done throughout, by 
reminding the reader of the path that we have travelled 
together, with gracious acknowledgement of the many 
shoulders she is standing on to make her argument. In her view, 
feminist critiques of marriage are relevant to same-sex 
marriage, although she remains open to the potential of 
transgressive change.  And then she leaves us by pointing to 
the questions that she has not answered:  who remains excluded 
and othered by the various strategies that have been pursued by 
people seeking marriage equality?  Is the truly feminist answer 
not sitting somewhere else?  Is there not a way to move entirely 




This is a powerful book.  It is well-written, offers an intriguing 
theoretical framework, and pays due homage to the authors 
upon whom it relies.  It is a reminder of how important it is to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37  Ibid at 165. 
38  Ibid at 175. 
39  Ibid at 196. 
 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 28] 126 
stop and think carefully about the roads we have travelled and 
reflect on what has been lost and gained when we argue for 
social change.  But there are also some weaknesses in the book.  
Without diminishing the power of what Barker has achieved, or 
indeed without offering the critique that this book did not leave 
every legal or theoretical stone unturned, let me briefly raise 
the following. 
 
First, the text seems to rest upon a premise that 
marriage is universal.  There is a tinge of irony here given Dr. 
Barker’s clear intention to do the opposite.40  The text is 
effective in its constant comparison of jurisdiction on each and 
every element of her argument.  However, the model of 
marriage that Barker creates does not pay attention to marriage 
as it may be practiced outside of “the West”, or perhaps even 
within other countries of the global North.  The text does not 
consider arranged marriage, for example, within the ideal of 
marriage that grounds this volume.  The jurisdictional reach of 
this text is strong, but I would have liked to see how the 
argument applied in a more global sense. 
 
Relatedly, I would also have liked to see Dr. Barker do 
more with the issue of whiteness.  She brings attention to 
questions of privilege, race, and class – particularly in her 
introductory chapters.  But as is often the case when working to 
unsettle something as enormous as the structures that support 
the institution of marriage, some questions of how we live our 
diversities beyond gender disappear.41  As we move to the 
text’s conclusion, as a reader, I wanted to know more about 
other more transgressive possibilities for family formation, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40  In my view, Barker uses marriage as experienced in North American 
and northern Europe as “marriage” while arguing that the institution 
itself is not universal.  See for example, Barker, supra note 4 at 5. 
41  See for example, Suzanne J Lenon, “Marrying Citizens! Raced 
Subjects? Rethinking the Terrain of Equal Marriage Discourse” 
(2005) 17 CJWL 405-421. 
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including more understandings of the fears of the sexual other.  
In particular, I wanted her to use her insightful voice to 
interrogate work like Suzanne Lenon’s, which has queried the 
power of whiteness in this context.42  In my view, given her 
introduction, more work could have been done to weave more 
integrally into the text questions of race, ability, Indigeneity, 
and belief. 
 
Second, the queer legal theory is thin.  As the title to 
the text indicates, this is a feminist critique of same-sex 
marriage, and as I note at the end of my analysis, perhaps even 
a socialist feminist critique at its heart.  At the outset, Barker 
offers that the text will be informed by two large and often 
contradictory bodies of theory, one termed second-wave 
feminist legal theory and the other, queer legal theory.  Indeed, 
the text offers the possibility that it will show us how these 
theories are in fact more compatible than derisive of each 
other.43 Yet, as the analysis unfolds, queer legal theory is really 
seen as other to feminist legal theories and takes a back seat, 
emerging more often than not as a counterargument to the 
dominant thread being sewn.  The text as a whole could not be 
what it is without the marriage of these two theoretical bodies, 
but it is, I would assert, more of a thick, feminist reading of 
marriage than a radically transformative queer reading.  
 
Third, other family models remain outside the 
parameters of the text.  As a single parent of an Indigenous 
child with deep roots in an extended notion of family, I kept 
looking for myself in the text.  What does the inevitable march 
towards formal equality for gays and lesbians say to those of us 
who stand with feet in many communities, but ultimately are 
not part of a conjugal family?  Again, as with the Western idea 
of marriage, and with queer legal theory, Barker pays attention 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
42  Ibid at 409. 
43  Barker, supra note 4 at 12. 
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to those that her analysis cannot fully embrace.  But for me, it 
wasn’t quite enough.  At page 111 of the text, I noted in the 
margin that I was so excited to see where the text would go.   
But a mere fourteen pages later, my margin notes queried how 
this all applied to single people, to single parents, or to 
polyamorists.  And when I closed the text, I knew that some of 
the questions of family that I care about the most were 
mentioned as the path for future study.  Moving beyond the 
marriage model is, as far as this text is concerned, a starting 
point for future research.44 
 
AND THAT’S WHAT WE DID. WE PUT FEAR AND 
PREJUDICE ON TRIAL45 
 
I am aware that grounding this review in a story drawn from 
my own teaching may be viewed as distracting.  But let me go 
back to my experience with my seminar students in the spring 
of 2013 to offer some final thoughts on why this book is such 
an important resource and text.  And indeed, let me return to 
the moment when, turning the lights on and off at page 26, I 
looked into the audience and wished that the play was over.  I 
offer an analysis here of some of what I thought in that 
moment, and how those students and this text give me 
assurances and optimism both in terms of the pedagogy but 
also for the direction that law is likely to lead us in terms of 
substantive equality for all of those whose diversities leave 
them excluded from this basic human right: access to a family. 
 
First, this play seems unidimensional!46 Although the 
staged reading of “8” was an intentional engagement with 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44  Ibid at 204. Academics always criticize other academics for the book 
that they wish they had written. Here, I am saying that I wish that the 
same careful and nuanced attention that Barker brings to the marriage 
model could also have been brought to the contemplation of non-
marital family models, cast broad. 
45  Supra note 3 at 47. 
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same-sex marriage, asking the students to embody the 
American pursuit of formal equality was not without risk.47  
What they did in the moment was, however, truly remarkable.  
They played each character with intention and with integrity, 
enabling the words that those characters spoke in the context of 
a trial to be given their full due.  And given the honesty of their 
reading, they put into motion and made possible a variety of 
critiques to be leveled against the very arguments their 
characters spoke.  They paid due attention to all the   
arguments, and acted with courage, as Barker does here as 
well.  This book gives the feminist argument against same-sex 
marriage the best opportunity to be heard.  It grounds the 
argument in history, supporting it with scholarly rigour, but 
then lays it bare, letting the words float out in the universe to 
be critiqued by the audience.  It embraces dissent, and sees that 
through critical engagement the most positive change will 
emerge. 
 
Second, this play doesn’t give “the other side”! The 
play is written from trial transcripts, and as such is based on 
actual words spoken, although it is also written by an award-
winning playwright to be both entertaining and polemical.  As 
such, it walks a careful line of political theatre, while also 
being designed with an audience talkback in mind.  That is, the 
play gives life to arguments that most people would never get 
to hear or see, and then allows for the actors to step out of their 
characters and talk to the audience honestly and from the heart.  
The actors’ preparations throughout the semester were not just 
the practicalities of staging a play; they were laying the 
groundwork to truly understand the use of law for social 
change from a theoretical perspective.  In this way, in their 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46  Because everything that ran through my head at that moment was 
exclamatory I have put an exclamation mark at the end of each of the 
starting sentences! 
47  Students are rarely asked to put their bodies into the learning of law 
in such a public way. 
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portrayals and in their responses to the questions posed, they 
complicated what the playwright has given them to say.  
Barker’s text models this very practice.  She anticipates from as 
many perspectives as she can the questions that will be placed 
at her feet as she walks the feminist critique of 
heteronormativity into the world of same-sex marriage 
equality.  And she does it with grace, with optimism, but 
mostly by paying due respect to the waves of feminist theorists 
she has read and cited. 
 
Third, this play embraces marriage as an enviable goal 
for all people to attain!  The play, while theatre, is still a clear 
and powerful argument that the exclusion of same-sex folk 
from the institution of marriage is discrimination of the worst 
kind.  And perhaps this is the argument that troubled me most; 
that what I had asked my students to do was to throw 
themselves onto the pyre of marriage equality.  But again, their 
careful portrayals and then their earnest answers showed their 
attention to diversity, not just on this issue, but on issues that 
are integral to sexuality:  faith, racism, classism, transphobia, 
mental health and care-giving.  They were able to present a 
clear and cogent argument for why excluding people from 
marriage on the basis of who they love was problematic, while 
offering that perhaps marriage itself was not the answer.  In my 
view, this too is the gift of the Barker text.  She is able to 
demonstrate with care and integrity why the pursuit of same-
sex marriage is an important legal and social goal, while still 
arguing that until marriage itself shifts fundamentally as an 
institution, the equality achieved through attaining that goal 
will only be partial. 
 
Fourth, this play embraces formal law, courts, and 
judges as the best way to achieve your legal goals!  The 
courtroom drama, while important and often compelling, is just 
one venue for change.  And what these students did was show 
that the courtroom is also a stage. In shifting that stage so that 
the audience becomes part of the play, they were modeling 
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anti-oppression in action.48 Here too, Barker’s text is an 
anthology of how to rethink a legal question, mostly by turning 
it on its head.  To really critique an issue you have to know it 
inside and out; you have to acknowledge your weaknesses and 
recognize where power sits.  As a guide for thinking about 
complicated legal questions and the best venue for solving 
those problems, Barker points in many directions. She shows 
that formal law, equality jurisprudence in particular, is only one 
tool, albeit an important tool, in the advocate’s legal toolbox. 
 
Finally, this play is not diverse!  While my students 
were diverse on race, gender identity, faith, political 
perspectives, and national origin, amongst other dimensions, 
the characters of the play were not.  In fact, some of the views 
that the characters expressed in the trial were indeed 
oppressive.49 The students embraced this play and confronted 
its lack of diversity in two key ways.  First, they cast 
themselves and in that casting did not worry about the gender 
or race or age of the character they chose.  For example, the 
white male teenage twins were portrayed by a 20-ish South 
Asian female-identified student and a 40-ish Scottish female-
identified visiting professor.  Second, they brought a queer 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48  Part of their coursework included introduction to some techniques 
drawn from the work of Augusto Boal and Paolo Freire, particularly 
image theatre. For a discussion of theatre of the oppressed in the law 
school classroom please see: Gillian Calder, “Performance, Pedagogy 
and Law: Theatre of the Oppressed in the Law School Classroom” in 
Zenon Bańkowski and Maksymilian Del Mar, eds, The Moral 
Imagination and the Legal Life: Beyond Text in Legal Education 
(London: Ashgate, 2013) at 215-254. 
49  For example, the character of “Ryan”, who is a young man testifying 
about being sent to a program aimed at transforming gay youth into 
straight youth, uses the words “mentally retarded” when talking about 
people who live with mental health issues. Although taken from the 
transcripts, and out of context in places, some of the testimony 
offered was jarring for the students to present. 
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legal theory lens to the performance of the play, in preparation, 
on the night, and in their debrief in the following weeks. Here 
is where I wish I had Barker’s book in hand when I “panicked” 
at page 26.  Barker works to bring a queer legal theory lens to 
the question of same-sex marriage.  And while, in my view, she 
ultimately embraces the lessons of socialist feminist theory as 
determinative, her text still weaves a queer perspective into the 
mix.  It reminds me that queering the legal family is as much 
about positive sexual expression as it is an exercise of 
boundary transgression.  The more that we can que(e)ry why 
law centres some forms of families over others, and support 
those who find themselves painfully excluded, the better all of 
our lived experiences will be.  The play taught me that.  And 
Nicola Barker’s beautiful text reinforced that message in 
abundance. 
 
DISCRIMINATIONS OF AN UNUSUAL CHARACTER50 
 
As I was writing this article the US Supreme Court released its 
two decisions on same-sex marriage, United States v Windsor 
(“DOMA”)51 and Hollingworth v Perry (“Prop8”).52  Read by 
many commentators as a victory for same-sex equality in the 
United States,53 both decided in 5-4 splits of the Court, the 
Defence of Marriage Act was found unconstitutional in DOMA 
and the plaintiffs were found not to have standing in Prop8. In 
neither judgment did any judge address the substantive 
question of the constitutionality of the heterosexual definition 
of marriage; rather, in DOMA they ensured that where same-
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50  Justice Kennedy, United States v Windsor 570 US 12 (2013) at para 
19, 133 S Ct 2675 
51  Ibid. 
52  Hollingsworth v Perry, 570 US __ (2013), 133 S Ct 2652 
53  See for example Paul Thornton, “DOMA and Prop 8 decisions: 
We’ve come a long way, say readers”, LA Times (26 June 2013) 
online: Los Angeles Times <http://www.latimes.com>.  
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sex marriage is legal, those who are married would have access 
to all federal benefits, as do heterosexual married folk in those 
same states. In California, the Court essentially restored the 
judgment of the lovely Justice Vaughn Walker, the judge who 
presided in “8” meaning that in the state of California, same-
sex marriage is (again) legal.  Surprising results – yes –  given 
the current make-up of the Court, but ultimately a just and fair 
result.  However it must be reinforced that alongside these 
“winning” judgments, the Court also rendered two judgments 
with devastating consequences for racialized and Indigenous 
Americans,54 leaving the issue of whiteness in the same-sex 
marriage story festering.   
 
Overall, nothing really shifts; formal equality as a path 
to inclusion remains the primary tool in same-sex marriage 
equality.  I do have to confess, though, to getting caught up in 
the frenzy, sitting on www.scotusblog.com on one device 
while on Twitter with the other, madly tweeting at each 
revelation of what the Court was going to do.  And as a final 
coda to the story of “8” the Play, it is a satisfying result.  But as 
Dr. Barker so eloquently writes in this text, 
 
 Seeking recognition through marriage can 
only be affirmative recognition in that it is 
necessary (and at the very least) leaves in place 
the framework of marriage. … affirmative 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54  Shelby County v Holder, 570 US __ (2013) and Adoptive Couple v 
Baby Girl 570 US __ (2013) U.S. LEXIS 4916, 2013 WL 3184627. 
In Shelby County the Court found unconstitutional provisions of the 
federal Voter’s Rights Act that had been put in place to prevent 
racially discriminatory voting laws from being enacted in states with 
a history of such practices.  In Adoptive Couple the Court addressed 
the status of an Indigenous father’s rights in adoption where the 
legislation at issue was focused on the significance of keeping 
Indigenous families united. The majority found that where a father 
played no formal role there was no family to keep together. 
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recognition is unlikely to be anything other than 
partial recognition of the range of relationships 
within the lesbian and gay communities.  … Not 
only is this partial recognition insufficient to 
justify overlooking the feminist critiques of 
marriage, these critiques also demonstrate the 
importance of addressing redistribution as part 
of a radical politics of recognition.55 
 
There is equality in the judgments and the change that 
surrounds them, but substantive equality will remain elusive as 
long as we focus so exclusively on inclusion within marriage 
rather than on transformative redistribution for all. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55  Barker, supra note 4 at 197. 
